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JURISPRUDENCE—MERELY JUDGMENT: A 
FALLIBILIST ACCOUNT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
BRUCE MILLER* 
How should judges decide the cases presented to them?  In our system 
the answer is, “according to law,” as opposed to the judge’s preferred 
outcomes.  But for at least a century, skeptics have cast doubt on whether 
adjudication under law is possible.  Judge Richard Posner, now retired 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has, for example, 
argued that the indeterminacy of legal argument and the influence of 
judges’ predispositions show that it is not.  Judge Posner thus 
recommends that judges give up on the rule of law in contested cases and 
instead candidly base their decisions on what they take to be in the best 
interests of society. 
 
Is there a convincing response to Judge Posner’s critique?  H.L.A. Hart 
famously sought to defend the rule of law as a law of rules, grounded in 
judges’ acceptance of a “Rule of Recognition,” as the ultimate basis for 
their decisions.  But Hart’s reliance on agreement among judges, 
coupled with his acknowledgement of an “open texture” where the Rule 
of Recognition breaks down, renders his explanation unhelpful to a judge 
confronted with seriously competing arguments. 
 
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive account of the rule of law asks judges to 
ground their decisions on principles that best fit with applicable pre-
existing law and accord with the most persuasive political justification 
for that law.  Dworkin offers ample prescriptive guidance to judges, but 
his concession that no interpretation of law can be proven correct seems 
to reinforce rather than rebut Judge Posner’s skepticism. 
 
 
* Bruce Miller taught at Western New England University Law School from 1980 until 
his retirement in 2020. 
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The fallibilist approach to inquiry, which grew out of the American 
Pragmatist tradition, offers a promising, anti-skeptical defense of 
Dworkin’s interpretive justification for adjudication under law. 
Fallibilism explains all inquiry as a process that begins with doubt and 
through investigation ends with the production of belief.  From the 
internal perspective of the inquirer, the belief so produced is the only 
truth inquiry is capable of generating.  But because the belief cannot be 
proven true, the inquirer recognizes that it is fallible, and thus subject to 
revision through subsequent inquiry. 
 
Fallibilism blunts the force of Judge Posner’s critique.  By providing a 
grounding for Dworkin’s account of adjudication that reconciles the 
search for truth with the persistence of controversy, it shows that the rule 
of law is possible. 
INTRODUCTION: IS THE RULE OF LAW AN ILLUSION? 
How should judges decide the cases presented to them?  In our legal 
system, the straightforward answer is obvious—judges should decide 
cases by applying the law to the relevant facts of each case.  This 
aspiration is what allows us to claim that we are governed by the rule of 
the law, or, to depersonalize the claim, that ours is a government of law 
and not of men [sic].  But what does this separation of laws, of the sources 
of legal legitimacy (the laws), from the people who apply them (the men) 
mean? 
Perhaps it is easier to start with a suggestion of what it conventionally 
does not, or at least should not, mean: Judges should not decide cases 
according to the outcomes they would prefer.  These preferences can 
themselves derive from many sources—a judge’s social background or 
identity, for example, but also her view of wise social policy or her moral 
values.  For a judge to rely on these personal perspectives or convictions, 
her “priors,” as Judge Richard Posner calls them,1 to decide the fate of the 
contending parties in front of her, is to abandon her obligation to apply the 
law in favor of an exercise of pure will.  This is precisely what Alexander 
Hamilton condemned in his Federalist 78 defense of the political 
legitimacy of judicial review.2  A decision according to a judge's 
 
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
28, 116, 137–140, 148–151 (2017) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY]; RICHARD A. 
POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 17–18 (2016) [hereinafter 
DIVERGENT PATHS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 106, 121 (2010) [hereinafter 
HOW JUDGES THINK]. 
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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preference or will flouts her duty to the parties and to society, because it 
comes from her instead of being grounded in law. 
But what does it mean for a decision to be grounded in law?  For one 
thing, it means that the sources of law used to decide a case must preexist 
the case itself.  If these sources are created by the judge in an act of 
deciding a case, the decision cannot, even in principle, be more than an 
iteration of her priors.  In addition, what can count as a source of law 
cannot be completely open-ended.  The premises from which a judge’s 
justification of her decision proceeds must have some limiting pedigree, 
whether it be social or moral.  Without a way to distinguish legal from 
nonlegal arguments, it is impossible to claim that any decision is grounded 
in law. 
These requirements—preexisting and limited sources—are 
themselves pretty minimal, and they are offered in a spirit of fallibilism.  
Arguments that either or both are dispensable to the rule of law cannot be 
ruled out.  But they do capture the narrative and rhetorical form of most 
(though certainly not all) published judicial opinions, perhaps the best 
evidence of our current conventions about adjudication. 
But however ecumenical and congruent with our formal practices, 
these conditions for identifying decisions based on law may thoroughly 
fail to exclude the baleful influence of a judge’s priors.  Any judicial 
opinion can be written to conform to the requirements that it be based on 
pre-existing and limited sources and to conceal its roots in the judges’ 
policy preferences or personal convictions, maybe even from the writer 
herself.  About a century ago, the American Legal Realists began to point 
out that extant legal doctrines and accepted modes of legal argument can 
be deployed to justify either outcome in any contested case.3  This critique 
was convincingly amplified a generation ago by commentators associated 
with the Critical Legal Studies movement, who correctly emphasized the 
absence of any test by which right outcomes could be distinguished from 
wrong ones.4  Perhaps the judges’ priors are inevitably the primary drivers 
 
3. Some classic Legal Realist texts making this point are: OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC 
LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW SCHOOLS (Oxford Univ. Press, 11th ed. 2008) (1930); Felix 
S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935); L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
4. Leading Critical Legal Studies pieces are: Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over 
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: 
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of the results of most, maybe even all, cases.  If so, the rule of law, at least 
if understood as requiring decisions according to pre-existing, properly 
pedigreed norms may be, and may always have been, illusory. 
I. THE SKEPTICISM OF A PROMINENT JUDGE 
Much popular discussion of adjudication, at least that which focuses 
on its most rarefied venues, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal 
Appeals Courts, takes this breakdown for granted.  The Judges who sit in 
these courts are routinely described in ideological terms as liberals or 
conservatives5 and often appear to have been nominated precisely because 
of their ideological commitments.6  The Supreme Court frequently 
resolves important, controversial cases by a vote of 5–4,7 with Justices 
appearing to align along a predictable liberal/conservative axis.  Senate 
confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees have devolved into a 
sort of Kabuki-like ritual, with nominees striving to conceal their political 
commitments in plain sight and steadfastly avoiding all but the most 
cliched discussion of the judicial role.8  Chief Justice Roberts’ oft-repeated 
observation, at his own confirmation hearing, that judges are like home 
plate umpires in baseball, neutrally calling balls and strikes, is mostly 
derided as either self-delusionally naive or consciously duplicitous.9 
 
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (1984). 
5. See Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 24, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html 
[https://perma.cc/8MWX-PURZ]; Chris Hayes Podcast with Dahlia Lithwick, Why is This 
Happening? MSNBC (Mar. 15, 2020, 7:48 PM), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vpz7Z13nNJk [https://perma.cc/PF5D-FKDP]. 
6. See Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts, 
NY TIMES (March 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court-
judges.html [https://perma.cc/J6DP-RGVU]. 
7. Examples from the last decade include: Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S.Ct. 735 (2020); 
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); 
Whole Womens’ Health Care v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Michigan v. EPA, 576 
U.S. 743 (2015); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015); Fisher v. 
University of Texas, 570 U.S. 297 (2013); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Humanitarian Law Project 
v. Holder, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
8. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–57, 549–641 
(2005) [hereinafter John G. Roberts]; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. 
Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 499–575 (2017); Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1343–152 (2009). 
9. See John G. Roberts, supra note 8, at 56. 
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One of the most prominent and prolific federal appellate judges to 
have served in the past half century, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has written extensively and often 
passionately about the contradiction between the conventional rhetoric 
that purports to explain and justify the rule of law and what he believes 
judges actually do, and indeed must do, in order to decide cases.10  Judge 
Posner believes he was appointed because of his presumed commitment 
to the “plain meaning” method of reading legal texts and to “strict 
construction” of the Constitution.11  And his early judicial career appeared 
to reflect a belief that by adherence to conventional sources of law, he 
could resolve cases both correctly and in a way that eliminated the 
influence of his own priors.12 
In recent years, though, Judge Posner has turned away from this faith 
in what he now pejoratively calls formalism, toward something like its 
opposite.13  In his most recent book on judging, The Federal Judiciary: 
Strengths and Weaknesses,14 Judge Posner argues, for example, that 
adherents to the plain meaning school have simply provided themselves 
with a license to cut off discussion of contested legal questions by fiat, 
declaring that their own preferred answers to these questions just happen 
to accord with the plain meaning of  whatever legal text is at issue.15  But 
Posner’s criticism of the conventional rhetoric of adjudication extends 
beyond just disdain for judicial claims to channel plain meaning.  He is 
now skeptical about the utility of legal reasoning more generally.16  In 
many (though, significantly, not all) contested cases, Posner maintains 
that the conventional sources and methods of decision offered by legal 
argumentation do not help judges reach the right answer.17  For Posner, 
the backward-looking focus of legal analysis on textual language, 
precedent cases, and settled principles and doctrinal rules of law—indeed 
 
10. HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 1; DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 74–221; THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, passim. 
11.  DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 76–92; HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 1, at 
41–56. 
12. Posner discusses his own evolution from what he calls formalism to legal realism in 
detail.  DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 76–92; HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 1, at 41–
56. 
13. Posner’s anti-formalism, or even anti-legalism, as he sometimes puts it, is set out in 
detail in THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 50–55, 77–82, 147–51, and in DIVERGENT 
PATHS, supra note 1, at 76-78. 
14. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1 at 50–55, 77–82, 147–51. 
15. Id. at 54–55, 80–81, 385–86. 
16. Id. at 86–101. 
17. Id. 
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the entire practice of interpreting previously promulgated sources of 
law—is often self-deceiving, wrongheaded, or both.18  The purported 
application of these sources is really a pretense for decision according to 
the judge’s policy preferences or an unthinking veneration of obsolete 
ideas.19  Moreover, when judges do not agree on the correct application of 
legal sources, “there is no analytical method of determining who is right—
no [settled] means of enforcing agreement or concession.”20 
Faced with this unworkable blend of indeterminacy, illusion and 
archaism, Posner urges judges to abandon reliance on pre-existing sources 
of law and methods of interpreting them in favor of “decid[ing] [] case[s] 
in a way that will comport with common sense and the fundamental ethical 
norms of society and have overall good consequences . . . .  The 
implication, which I do not shrink from, . . . is that the judicial role is to a 
considerable extent legislative.”21  To his credit, Posner also urges, but 
does not expect, candor from any judges who would adopt his 
recommendation.22  He realizes, apparently, that any judge who openly 
acknowledged the absence of constraint by legal sources and methods of 
argument would concede that we are governed by her preferred social 
policies, or her priors, rather than by the rule of law. 
II. H.L.A. HART AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW OF RULES 
Significantly, Judge Posner admits that judges are not always 
unbound by law.  Some cases are indeed resolvable by interpreting and 
applying previously promulgated legal sources.23  In these cases, he 
concedes, judges ought not impose their views of the best outcome, all 
things considered.24  But these cases are limited, by Posner’s lights, to 
those in which the legal sources and the methods of applying them align 
clearly and without controversy, that is to the cases on which everyone 
(save, presumably, for the losing party) agrees on the outcome and the 
 
18. Id. at 27–28, 50–51. 
19. Id. at 27–28, 50-51, 75–77. 
20. Id. at 54–55. 
21. Id. at 30. 
22. Id. at 21–22, 115–16, 136–38. 
23. See HOW JUDGES THINK supra note 1, at 269–281; THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra 
note 1, at 80; DIVERGENT PATHS supra note 1, at 2, 107 (quoting Holmes “Judges Must 
Legislate, but Only Interstitially”), 176–78. 
24. See sources cited supra, note 23. 
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reasons for it.25  Here, Judge Posner seems to invoke an extreme version 
of the defense of the rule of law articulated by the eminent British 
philosopher, H.L.A. Hart in the early 1960s.  Hart argued that the law a 
judge ought to apply derived from the sources of law and methods of 
analysis used by judges acting in the deciding judge’s legal system 
generally.26  It is the shared acceptance of practices for deciding cases that 
validates a particular judge’s use of them and, hence, justifies her decision 
as one arrived at under law.27  In short, for Hart, a judge’s obligation to 
decide cases according to law is met when her decisions adhere to criteria 
recognized as valid by her legal community.28 
Hart did not deny that a judge’s application of this principle, which 
he famously called the “Rule of Recognition,” could be controversial: 
No doubt the practice of judges . . . in which the actual existence of a 
rule of a rule of recognition consists, is a complex matter. . . . [T]here 
are certainly situations in which questions as to the precise content and 
scope of this kind of rule, and even as to its existence, may not admit 
of a clear or determinate answer.29 
Still, Hart believed that his account of decisions made according to 
law could accommodate this uncertainty, so long as judges normally 
subscribed to “a unified or shared official acceptance of the Rule of 
Recognition containing the system’s criteria of validity.”30  Hart also 
acknowledged that adjudication under criteria provided by the rule of 
recognition was not mechanical.  Only in a world “characterized only by 
a finite number of features, and these together with all the modes in which 
they could combine were known to us,”31 could the question of how to 
apply law in a particular case be settled in advance and never involve, “at 
the point of actual application, a fresh choice between open 
alternatives.”32  For Hart, this was emphatically not our world.  “[T]he 
necessity for such choice is thrust upon us because we are men [sic], not 
gods.”33 
 
25. Id.  See HOW JUDGES THINK supra note 1, at 79, where Posner distinguishes between 
cases where the “law falls short,” requiring judicial legislation, from those where law is 
sufficient to decide the case. 
26. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-150 (1961). 
27. Id. at 97–107, 142. 
28. Id. at 112–14. 
29. Id. at 106. 
30. Id. at 111. 
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For Hart, a concession that judicial discretion is inevitable did not 
undermine his defense of the rule of law because, he believed, the need 
for judges to exercise it is relatively rare.  Here, Hart appealed to the 
distinction between clear cases, where the relevant ground for decision is 
uncontroversial (where the rule “certainly applies”)34 and those where 
“there are reasons for both asserting and denying”35 that the claimed 
ground for a decision actually governs the outcome.  While admitting that 
“[n]othing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra 
of doubt,”36  Hart insisted that this inevitable “open texture”37 in the law 
occurred only at its fringe and thus did not threaten the law’s generally 
settled meaning.  Most cases, certainly enough to validate the system as a 
whole, lay within the central core, safely governed by the Rule of 
Recognition. 
We can almost see Judge Posner preparing to pounce: What if, as in 
our own current legal culture, there is little or no agreement among our 
warring armies of liberal and conservative judges on any proffered Rule 
of Recognition?  Even if a measure of very abstract agreement on the 
content of such a Rule can be identified, what if all, or nearly all, contested 
cases are argued within Hart’s penumbra of doubt?  Posner’s point is that 
our agreed upon sources of law and methods of applying them, at best, 
contain only a tiny, central core, surrounded by a vast and highly porous 
open texture. 
Hart’s effort to rescue the rule of law from the clutches of legal 
realism ends up, Posner might say, reinforcing his own skeptical position.  
Perhaps ironically, the reason for their alignment is that Posner accepts 
Hart’s conclusion that the rule of law must be a law of rules.38  For Hart, 
a judge’s decision is constrained by law when it accords with the Rule of 
Recognition, when it is determined by what participants in the legal 
system recognize as the substance, sources and methods of legal 
 
34. Id. at 119. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 12–32, 135, 140. 
38. Posner sometimes claims that his proposed “pragmatic” method of deciding cases by 
adopting the best “legislative” solution counts as adjudication under law.  But this claim rests 
(weakly) on the proposition that any judicial resolution of a case is, ipso facto, one entitled to 
be deemed to be under law.  See, e.g., DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 176.  But this 
foundation is logically impossible because Posner’s basic position is that judicial legislation is 
warranted, indeed optimal, precisely because of the failure of law to generate determinate 
solutions.  The law he refers to in this sense, is the law of rules urged by Hart.  See, e.g., THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 80, 86–95, 99–101; DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 
175–77. 
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argument.  Posner concurs.  But for Posner, except in the rare 
uncontroversial case, there simply is no Rule of Recognition, and thus no 
constraining law.  Instead, there is endless indeterminacy and no means of 
resolving it. 
Hart also largely yields to Posner’s claim that the legal sources and 
methods themselves play only a small role in generating the right 
outcomes in contested cases.  Though he insists that judges are generally 
bound by rules, it is the fact of agreement among judges on the reasons 
for an outcome, rather than the persuasiveness of their reasons, that places 
a case within Hart’s central core.39  And when there is no agreement to be 
had, a deciding judge must make a fresh, Posnerian, choice between open 
alternatives, guided only, and inevitably, by her priors or policy 
preferences.  For Hart, no less than Posner, legal argument itself has little 
justificatory force. 
Nor can Hart’s appeal to agreement as the arbiter of legal truth 
distinguish clear cases from controversial ones.  Obviously, a case is 
neither clear nor controversial, easy nor hard, until it has been presented 
for resolution.  When it is, it is of course true that a judge might recognize 
that most or all of her peers would resolve the case in the same way.  But 
in our system, a judge’s acknowledgement of that consensus would not 
provide justification for her own decision.  As Hart concedes, we expect 
judges to decide cases by applying the law itself, not their understanding 
of what their peers believe the law to be.40  Certainly, an opinion that 
presents its rationale in terms of deference to the presumed view of other 
judges, as opposed to the deciding judge’s understanding of what is 
required by the relevant legal sources (e.g., relevant precedents, principles 
of law, history) would both be quite rare and generally received as 
inconsistent with the independent judgment we expect judges to exercise.  
If a case is easy, it is because the relevant law, not the agreement of judges 
in general, makes it so. 
We also sometimes maintain that previously decided cases were easy 
(for Hart, within the settled core) or hard (within the penumbra, or open 
texture).  When we do, it is even clearer that it is not any agreement, or 
Rule of Recognition, that prompts our assessment.  Consider Dred Scott 
v. Sandford,41 a case that is now often condemned as clearly—and 
tragically, for African Americans and the nation itself—wrongly decided.  
What could it mean for Dred Scott to be an easy case, albeit in the opposite 
 
39. See HART, supra note 26, at 112–14, 123–26, 131–32, 135–37, 119–20, 143. 
40. Id. at 135–37. 
41. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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direction from the way it was actually resolved?  For Hart, this situation 
is impossible because 
[a] supreme tribunal has the last word in saying what the law is and, 
when it has said it, the statement that the court was ‘wrong’ has no 
consequences . . . .  The decision may, of course, be deprived of legal 
effect by legislation, but the very fact that resort to this is necessary 
demonstrates the empty character, so far as the law is concerned, of 
the statement that the court’s decision was wrong.42 
If Hart is right about this, Dred Scott can now be said to be inconsistent 
with the American Constitution only because it was overruled by the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  When decided, Dred Scott was 
correct, simply because, under the Rule of Recognition, it was issued by 
our highest court, whose rulings we regard as dispositive. 
But the force of a claim that Dred Scott was legally wrong, and 
obviously so, does not derive from the effect of the Post Civil War 
Amendments.  It depends instead on showing that Dred Scott was wrong 
when decided, that it was inconsistent with the antebellum Constitution in 
effect in 1857.  This claim may itself be wrong, of course.  William Lloyd 
Garrison certainly thought so.43  Frederick Douglass did not.44  But the 
claim is not incoherent, as Hart’s Rule of Recognition would have it. 
The contemporary condemnation of Dred Scott might, alternatively, 
warrant little more than a shrug from Hart on the ground that it wrongly 
presumes that our current agreement on the meaning of the 1857 
Constitution was accessible to our forebears.  On this view, we can only 
say that under our now shared understanding of the 1857 Constitution, our 
Rule of Recognition, we retroactively deem Dred Scott to have been 
wrongly decided.  We cannot properly hold Chief Justice Taney to account 
for having had a different understanding.  Because of this 
incommensurability of perspectives, Dred Scott can never be an obviously 
wrong (or right) decision; it is, like current contested cases, beyond legal 
evaluation altogether. 
This agonistic outlook appears to explain Judge Posner’s impatience 
with the current consensus that two other infamous Supreme Court 
 
42. HART, supra note 26, at 138. 
43. Garrison called the Constitution a “covenant with death,” and an “agreement with 
hell.”  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How 
It Was Made, NAT’L ARCHIVES (2000), https://www.archives.gov/
publications/prologue/2000/winter/garrisons-constitution-1.html [https://perma.cc/79PU-
CEBH]. 
44. Frederick Douglass, Oration delivered at Corinthian Hall, Rochester (July 5th, 1852). 
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decisions, Plessy v. Ferguson45 and Korematsu v. United States,46 were 
also obviously wrongly decided.  In both instances, according to Posner, 
we supposedly more enlightened moderns are simply projecting our own 
views backward onto judges who, in their own time and place, had their 
own perfectly acceptable policy reasons for the outcomes they reached.  
Law had nothing to do with either these outcomes or our subsequent 
disapproval of them.  For Judge Posner, our consensus that Korematsu and 
Plessy were wrongly decided and clearly so, is nothing more than Monday 
morning quarterbacking.47 
How could the claim that Dred Scott was an easy case, for Scott rather 
than Sanford, be sustained?  The effort would start by examining Chief 
Justice Taney’s purported justification for his decision: Taney held that 
Scott, as an escaped slave claiming freedom under the authority of an act 
of Congress, could not be a citizen of the United States, and, therefore, of 
any state in the union, for purposes of Federal Court diversity jurisdiction. 
We think [slaves] are not, and that they are not included, and were not 
intended to be included under the word “citizens” in the constitution, 
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that 
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.48 
Taney’s rationale was rooted in his understanding of the Declaration 
of Independence and his presumption that its signers were too 
distinguished to be capable of hypocrisy: 
The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally 
conclusive: 
It begins by declaring that, "[w]hen in the course of human events it 
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands 
which have connected them with another, and to assume among the 
powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of 
nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions 
of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel 
them to the separation." 
It then proceeds to say: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that 
all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are 
 
45. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
46. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
47. FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 51–52; see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 294 (2003). 
48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857). 
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instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.” 
The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole 
human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day 
would be so understood.  But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved 
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of 
the people who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the 
language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct 
of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence 
would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles 
they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind to which they 
so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received 
universal rebuke and reprobation.49 
If Taney’s conclusion was wrong, it is not because his twenty first century 
critics have so labeled it.  It is wrong because the rationale just quoted is 
flawed.  And there are multiple reasons why it might be.  For example, 
Taney’s originalist methodology, relying on the Declaration of 
Independence as the source of meaning of citizenship for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes, could be wrong.  Perhaps a citizen was instead 
someone who was understood to be one in 1857, an understanding that 
might include putatively free African Americans.  Alternatively, perhaps 
the framers were no less capable of hypocrisy than their successors.  The 
Declaration of Independence was indeed universal in its proclamation of 
human equality.  Its framers were just unable or unwilling to acknowledge 
that self-evident truth, blinded or self-deceiving as they were by their 
deeply white supremacist worldview.  These are just two, perhaps the two 
most immediately obvious, arguments that Taney was wrong on the law 
in Dred Scott.  There are no doubt many others.  The point is that if we 
are correct to say today that Dred Scott, or Plessy, or Korematsu were not 
hard cases, but easy ones, each decided wrongly, it is because these claims 
are justified by sound legal arguments.  And so it is as well with easy cases 
that were correctly decided, Brown v. Board of Education,50 say, or 
McCulloch v. Maryland.51  They are not easy because of any agreement, 
or Rule of Recognition, but because of the exceptionally persuasive 
arguments that can be made for them. 
This does not show, of course, that Judge Posner, the legal realists, or 
critical legal studies scholars have gotten things wrong.  The 
 
49. Id. at 409–10. 
50. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
51. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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indeterminacy of legal argument may still render it useless in contested 
cases.  The point is that there is no difference between a hard case and an 
easy one.  Both are capable of resolution by law only if the efficacy of 
legal argument abides despite its indeterminacy.  It could still be true, as 
Posner claims, that just when legal argument is needed to resolve 
disagreement, it must inevitably fail because of that very same 
disagreement.52 
If Hart’s effort to ground legal justification in underlying consensus, 
the Rule of Recognition, fails, his argument nevertheless does engage our 
question: How should judges decide the cases presented to them?  Hart 
recognizes that any proposed answer to this question is helpful only if it 
proceeds from what he calls the “internal” perspective,53 that is, the 
position of the deciding judge who is a participant in (or insider to) the 
system of adjudication.  This internal perspective contrasts with an 
“external” one, that of an observer or outsider to the system, whose goal 
is to understand or explain it.54  The distinction is illustrated by how the 
Rule of Recognition might appear to an outsider, say a political scientist 
describing our legal system, as compared to a judge tasked with deciding 
a case.  From the political scientist’s external perspective, Hart’s account 
of the Rule of Recognition may be accurate.  The substance, sources, and 
methods of adjudication in the American legal system may indeed be just 
what judges, generally and over time, recognize as such. 
But from the internal perspective of the deciding judge, the Rule of 
Recognition fails to deliver on Hart’s goal.  It has no prescriptive force for 
the case in front of her, whether that case is easy or hard.  As we have 
seen, trying to apply it can only cause that judge to suspend her own 
judgment, or worse, to decline even to make a judgment, about what the 
law requires, in favor of relying on what a consensus of her similarly 
situated peers would do. 
Unless the judicial role is purely a pose, then, a conscientious judge 
will strive to decide her cases by applying the law rather than guessing 
what other judges would do.  And it is for this kind of conscientious judge 
that Hart is especially disappointing.  Under the Rule of Recognition, the 
case is either easy, because of a presumed judicial consensus, or hard, and, 
therefore up for grabs, because other judges would agree that there are 
plausible arguments for both sides.  In neither event does a judge’s 
independent understanding of the law play any role.  It is either 
 
52. See discussion supra Part I. 
53. HART, supra note 26, at 134–36, 143. 
54. Id. at 143. 
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unnecessary, because external to the hypothesized consensus, or 
insufficient, because controversial. 
III. RONALD DWORKIN’S INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF JUDGING 
A prominent, though often sympathetic, critic of Hart, the late Ronald 
Dworkin, sought to apply Hart’s internal perspective in a way that could 
both describe the practice of judges more accurately and also offer useful 
prescriptive advice on how they should decide cases.  Significantly, 
Dworkin saw the practice of adjudication as a backward looking one, 
aimed at ascertaining and applying previously promulgated law, rather 
than, as Posner argues, creating new law to fit the case to be decided.55  
The practice is, Dworkin argued, one of interpretation.56  And an 
interpretive approach, or as Dworkin would say, attitude, is one which 
seeks to construct the most accurate understanding of the legal materials 
relevant to the case to be resolved. 
Constructing this understanding requires first that the judge identify 
both the pertinent formal sources of law, for example, statutes, the 
Constitution, and previously decided cases.57  The judge must then 
assemble the possible, often competing and complex, ways of ascertaining 
the meaning of these sources and how they might bear on the case at hand.  
These methods of applying the formal sources of law might include, for 
example, reasoning by analogy to previously decided cases, defining the 
linguistic meaning of relevant texts, referring to the legislative history 
accompanying the enactment of statutes, or the public meaning of 
Constitutional provisions at the time of their adoption.  Most importantly 
for Dworkin, they also include the purpose, or point, of each of these 
sources of law, both individually, and taken as a whole.58  Dworkin 
acknowledged that even assembling these raw materials is a formidable 
task (he calls his ideal judge, “Hercules”),59 and that judges will disagree 
about their content, as we know they may about anything.60  Nevertheless, 
it is sufficient, for Dworkin, if we are convinced that this pre-interpretive 
effort is one that judges should, and generally do, undertake. 
 
55. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986) [hereinafter LAW’S EMPIRE]. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 65–66. 
58. Id. at 65, 91–92. 
59. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977) [hereinafter TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 239. 
60. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 1–44, 76–86, 87–113. 
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The next step in the interpretive process is to fashion, or in Dworkin’s 
words, to construct, a proposition of law that best ‘fits’ with, or explains, 
the identified legal sources and methods and will, when then applied, 
resolve the case to be decided.61  Dworkin recognized that it will be a rare 
case in which a decisive proposition can fit with every pre-existing source 
and method.  Some may be in tension with one another in ways that cannot 
be resolved easily, or at all.  Others may properly be disregarded, as 
“mistakes,” because they are striking outliers to the pre-existing law taken 
as a whole.62  Again, Dworkin acknowledged the inevitable, even 
fundamental, disagreement among judges as to the content of the decisive 
principle that provides the best fit with this pre-existing law.  Dworkin’s 
task was not to quiet this disagreement, but to explain it in a manner that 
is consistent with, rather than fatal to, the rule of law.63  His goal at this 
stage was only to convince us that an aspiration to construct a rule of 
decision that best fits with the assembled legal materials is what motivates, 
and should motivate, a conscientious judge. 
The final stage in Dworkin’s progress toward what he called 
interpretive integrity, asks judges to try to find the “best constructive 
interpretation” of the relevant law.  This search, which Dworkin identified 
as the dimension of “justification,” sometimes demands that the judge 
examine the entire “political structure and legal doctrine” of her 
community.64  This justification step is, of course, exceedingly ambitious, 
abstract, and, Dworkin conceded, much more controversial than his first 
two steps, especially if offered as an accurate description of what judges 
do (or at least say they do) in their published opinions.  What Dworkin 
was seeking here is a judge’s identification of a principle which would, if 
true, provide the most accurate justification of the legal system, its body 
of rules, texts, cases, and interpretive tools, as a whole.65   
An appeal to this kind of abstract principle of political justice is useful 
to a conscientious judge in two ways.  First, it can resolve controversial 
questions of “fit” between competing propositions of law.  And second, it 
can sometimes justify disregarding an apparently settled proposition of 
law in favor of one that is rooted in a sounder understanding of our legal 
 
61. Id. at 66–67. 
62. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 118–23. 
63. See, e.g., LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 239–50; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 
supra note 58, at 81–130. 
64. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 105–30; LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 
55, at 228–38, 255. 
65. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 81–130; LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 
55, at 239–50. 
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past.66  The judge is still seeking “fit,” but at a deeper, more explicitly 
political level.  The dimensions of fit and justification operate 
reciprocally, each checking the other, to produce the best resolution, the 
right answer, to the contested case.  As Dworkin put it, a judge’s 
working theory will include convictions about both fit and 
justification.  Convictions about fit will provide a rough threshold 
requirement that an[y proposed] interpretation must meet. . . .  That 
threshold will eliminate interpretations that some judges would 
otherwise prefer, so the brute facts of our own legal history will in this 
way limit the role any judge’s personal conviction can play in his 
decisions. . . .  If his threshold of fit is wholly derivative from and 
adjustable to his own conviction of justice so that the latter 
automatically provides an eligible interpretation, then he cannot claim 
in good faith to be interpreting legal practice at all . . . . 
 
 Hard cases arise, for any judge, when his threshold test does not 
discriminate between two or more interpretations of some statute or 
line of cases.  Then he must . . . ask which shows the community’s 
structure and institutions-its public standards as a whole-in a better 
light from the standpoint of political morality.67 
Obviously, Dworkin did not and could not claim that judges agree on 
which basic principles of political morality best explain and justify our 
existing law and approaches to understanding that law.  On the contrary, 
he argued that it is precisely their divergence at this most basic level that 
best explains the profound disagreement we see among judges in 
controversial cases.68  Legal disagreement is a function of clashing 
political perspectives, united only by their shared roots in our legal 
history.  Judges are anything but umpires.  They are more like applied 
political philosophers. 
Like Posner, Dworkin urged our actual judges to be candid about, 
rather than to hide through a false pose of neutrality, the principles of 
political morality which underlie their decisions.69  And he developed, 
over his long and prolific career, his own account of the best justification 
for our legal, particularly our constitutional, system.  He began by positing 
that our constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory, namely, 
 
66. See, e.g., LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 29–30, 379–99. 
67. Id. at 255–56. 
68. Id. at 30–47, 79–87, 254–58; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 79–90, 
105–30. 
69. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 239–66. 
 
2020] MERELY JUDGMENT 231 
 
“that citizens [do] have [certain] moral rights against the state.”70  Over 
time, his argument converged on a particular moral right, that of each 
citizen to be treated by government with equal concern and respect.71  
Much of his work elaborated what he took to be the consequences of this 
principle for particular contemporary legal controversies.72  Dworkin 
tried, in short, to practice his recommended theory of interpretation. 
Dworkin did not, it must be emphasized, suggest that he or any sitting 
judge, past or present, did, or ever could fully measure up to the 
unrealistically exacting standards of what he called interpretive integrity.73  
Still, on occasion, our judges display the sort of candor and philosophical 
approach he urged.  The plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,74 for example, defends women’s abortion rights on the basis of its 
authors’ understanding of our Constitution’s grounding in a right of equal 
participation in the political and economic life of the country.75  Similarly 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Virginia76 
articulates an understanding of the equal protection guarantee that is 
rooted in freedom from political, economic, and social subordination.77  
By contrast, Justice Thomas’ dissent in U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton78 is based on his conviction that the Constitution embodies a 
union of independent states, whose sovereignty survived the Civil War 
and the Amendments which followed.79  His commitment to that vision 
 
70. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 138. 
71. Id. at 272–788; see LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 295–309, 403–04, 407–08; see 
also Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 
(1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 283 (1981).  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) 
[hereinafter A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]. 
72. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 379–97, 295–312; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 
supra note 59, at 223–39; Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, 1 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y & 
POL’Y 24 (1983); see generally A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 70. 
73. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 245, 257–58, 265; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 
supra note 59, at 129–30. 
74. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
75. Id. at 855–56 (discussing women’s rights to participate). 
76. See generally United States v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 515 (1996). 
77. Id. at 534, note 7. 
78. See generally U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
79. Id. at 845–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Constitution is an 
agreement among states as opposed to the people). 
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may also explain his reading of the Interstate Commerce Clause in cases 
like U. S. v. Lopez80 and United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer.81 
Even if these occasions are relatively rare, Dworkin’s account of 
adjudication is not excessively idealistic.  By offering a standard for 
assessing how judges should decide cases—our question—that both takes 
seriously the practices of judges as reflected in the opinions they write and 
relies entirely on a commitment to accurate interpretation of past legal 
sources, Dworkin has provided, if he is right, an account of the rule of law 
that can withstand (though it certainly does not rebut) the indeterminacy 
critique of Posner and the Legal Realists. 
Dworkin’s approach also offers a justification of judge-made change 
in applicable law in a system that looks entirely backward for sources of 
legal authority.  The sea change in our law of racial equality between 
Plessy v. Ferguson82 and Brown v. Board of Education83 can be explained 
by Judge Posner only as a shift in the policy preferences of the judges who 
decided these cases and all those in between.84  The meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause had nothing to do with either, precisely because that 
meaning is contested.  And an adherent of Hart’s Rule of Recognition 
would be forced to choose either to follow the “separate but equal” 
precedent of Plessy, just because it was a precedent, or depart from it by 
making new law (legislating from the bench), rather than declaring the 
law as it is.  Dworkin, by contrast, justifies Brown on the ground that it 
reflects a more accurate understanding than does Plessy of the principles 
of political morality that underlie our law as a whole, even if the specific 
legislative history that accompanies the Fourteenth Amendment seems to 
authorize racial segregation of the public schools.85 
IV. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SKEPTICISM 
But how could Dworkin possibly be right?  The indeterminacy 
elephant in the room seems to loom larger than ever if judges follow his 
interpretive approach.  Not only did Dworkin acknowledge rampant 
disagreement among judges about how sources of law might fit together 
 
80. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
81. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Water Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
82. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
83. See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
84. FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 51, 104–05; HOW JUDGES THINK supra note 1, 
at 279–81. 
85. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 379–92. 
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to provide the right resolution of a current case; he also explicitly 
introduced political conflict at the most fundamental level as the 
explanation for our most profound legal disagreements.  This is Legal 
Realism on steroids!  But Dworkin was undeterred.  He denied that the 
indeterminacy critique derails the prescriptive force of his argument and 
audaciously even claimed that for a deciding judge, nearly every legal 
dispute has a single right answer.86 
Dworkin’s faith in the rule of law as a governing ideal stems from a 
distinction both he and Hart87 (and many others)88 have drawn between 
internal and external skepticism.  Recall that both Hart and Dworkin 
sought to answer our question—what should judges do?—by trying to 
adopt the point of view of the judge herself—an internal perspective on 
the process of adjudication—because it is that of the process’ protagonist.  
We have seen that Hart’s Rule of Recognition fails to offer useful 
prescriptive advice to judges tasked to decide cases framed by competing 
arguments.  Because it depends on agreement, or at least on consensus, 
among judges, it breaks down when agreement is absent, i.e., in contested 
cases.89  For Dworkin, on the other hand, legal argument begins, rather 
than ends, when consensus breaks down.  This is possible because most 
judges reject (and all should reject) a skeptical outlook on what they do, 
as they do it.  They are not (and should not be) internal skeptics.90 
External skepticism about the possibility of adjudication according to 
law—the position expressed by the Legal Realists, critical legal studies 
adherents, and, in his role as an observer or describer of judicial practice, 
Judge Posner—is of a different sort.  External skeptics point to the 
unrelenting controversy in law—the judicial appointments based on 
ideology, the ever longer list of 5–4 Supreme Court decisions, the clashes 
between originalism and the “living” Constitution and between reliance 
on text versus purpose in statutory interpretation—and remind us of what 
we know only too well: that there is, as Judge Posner correctly observes, 
 
86. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 279–90. 
87. HART, supra note 26, at 134–36, 143. 
88. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (Oxford Press 1986); 
HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION (Oxford Press 1995) [hereinafter 
PRAGMATISM]; HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE (James F. Conant ed. 1990) 
[hereinafter REALISM]; HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1981); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1979); Bernard Williams, Internal and External Reasons, in MORAL LUCK 101 (1981). 
89. See supra notes 26–53 and accompanying text. 
90. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 76–86, 266–75; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra 
note 59, at 279–90. 
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“no analytical method for determining who is right—no settled means of 
enforcing agreement or concession.”91  For the external skeptic, no 
interpretation of our legal sources can be right, or, worse, even useful 
because none of them can be proven either correct or incorrect.  Dworkin 
was agnostic about the truth of external skepticism92 but rejected its 
dismissive consequences for legal interpretation.93  We might go further 
than Dworkin and concede that controversy is pervasive not just in law, 
but in, at least, all the disciplines that seek to understand human behavior 
and society, and that none of the disciplines seem to have settled standards 
for resolving their disputes.94  Even the natural sciences, as the 
philosopher of science Larry Laudan has shown, do not enjoy agreed upon 
criteria for assessing the validity of competing claims on disputed 
questions of truth made by their practitioners.95 
It may be that only God, or the end of history, can quiet external 
skepticism.  But that, Dworkin argued, is irrelevant to what we humans do 
every day in all of our practices, from fiction writing to the study of 
history, to economic analysis, to every other human effort at 
understanding, including judges’ efforts to decide cases under law.96  As 
we engage in any of these practices, we are (or should be) aware that none 
of our approaches, methods, or conclusions can be proven right, and that 
all of them are inevitably influenced by our backgrounds and the 
dispositions we carry with us—by our priors, as Judge Posner would have 
it.  And yet, unlike the external skeptic, none of us is (or at least should 
be) a practicing skeptic.  None of us believes that the products of our own 
inquiries are arbitrary, though we of course must concede that they may 
be wrong or inadequate, and are always subject to revision and 
reassessment.  Instead, we believe that our work is, to the best of our 
ability, accurate and correct.  From our internal perspective, it provides 
the single, if provisional, right answer to whatever problem we were 
 
91. See THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
92. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 80, 206. 
93. Id. at 83–85, 269–71. 
94. See generally E. H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? (1961); ALVIN WARD GOULDNER, 
THE COMING CRISIS IN WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970); THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, 
IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) [hereinafter CONTINGENCY); RICHARD 
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PHILOSOPHY]. 
95. LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM: SOME KEY CONTROVERSIES IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1990). 
96. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra, note 55, 45–86, 225–75. 
 
2020] MERELY JUDGMENT 235 
 
seeking to solve.97  The fact that historians disagree about, say, whether 
the Dred Scott decision was a significant cause of the Civil War, and that 
their competing positions are influenced by the different lived experiences 
they bring to the inquiry, does not mean that their work does not aid in our 
understanding of our past, or that their disagreements are not about 
history.  Most importantly, it does not mean that instead of doing the best 
historical research they can, they should throw up their hands and each 
say that Dred Scott means what they prefer that it mean and that’s all there 
is or can be to the matter.  The practice of judging according to law, 
Dworkin would argue, merits no less respect. 
Posner’s contrary position, Dworkin has argued, reflects the corrosive 
and unwarranted influence of external skepticism on the internal practice 
of judging.98  Posner has become what Hart called a disappointed 
absolutist.99  Because he rightly understands that no meaningful 
proposition or law can be proven true, Posner the theorist has concluded 
that claims to have interpreted law correctly have no value and should be 
jettisoned in favor of the imposition of the judges’ social policy 
preferences.100  Posner the theorist, however, acknowledges that Posner 
the judge has sometimes written opinions that purport to engage in legal 
interpretation.101  Perhaps these opinions are a bad faith cover for the 
preferences of Posner, the social engineer.  Perhaps they are hypocritical 
gestures of obeisance to an ideal he now rejects.  Or perhaps, they 
represent what he really thinks about the law.  It is not easy to actually 
practice internal skepticism. 
V. FALLIBILISM AS A MODEL FOR JUDGING 
The outlook on adjudication advanced by Dworkin is an example of 
an approach to human inquiry known as fallibilism.  Fallibilism is a strain 
of the American pragmatist tradition in philosophy that developed in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century.102  The connection is ironic because 
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Dworkin claimed to reject pragmatism entirely, associating it with 
Posner’s skepticism about law and consequent embrace of unbridled 
judicial policymaking.103  Some thinkers in the pragmatist tradition, 
Justice Holmes for example,104 Posner himself and the eminent American 
philosopher, Richard Rorty,105 are indeed skeptics.  But its founders, 
William James, John Dewey, and C.S. Peirce,106 and more contemporary 
adherents like Hilary Putnam,107 Cornel West,108 Margaret Radin,109 and 
Ian Shapiro,110 definitely are not. 
Fallibilism views inquiry of any sort as an activity that seeks to 
appease doubt by producing belief.111  This definition precisely captures 
the form taken by judicial deliberation.  A judge faced with competing 
legal positions in a case does not know, in advance of considering the 
arguments for each of them, which is right and is obligated to be open to 
both sides.  The point of the judge’s evaluation of the parties’ arguments 
is to arrive at a belief that one of them is sounder than the other.  Arrival 
at this belief assuages the obligatory uncertainty with which the inquiry 
began.  This is all a judge (or anyone) can do, but as C.S. Peirce put it, it 
is enough:  
With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation 
of doubt it ends.  Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of 
opinion.  We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we 
seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion.  But put this fancy to 
the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached 
we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. . . .  The 
most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall 
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think to be true.  But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, 
indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.112 
Though Peirce was not addressing adjudication in particular here, but 
inquiry generally, this description explains how judges, save for any so 
riddled by internal skepticism that they cannot budge from their initial 
doubts, decide cases.  What distinguishes their inquiry, their specific 
march from uncertainty to resolution, from doubt to belief, is that their 
subject matter is what the law applicable to the case before them requires.  
And for Dworkin, what the law requires is the outcome that grows out of 
the best interpretation of the relevant legal texts and precedents.  That 
interpretation, in turn, is the one which fits best with these sources, taken 
as a whole, seen through the lens offered by the political principles that 
best explain and justify them. 
For Peirce, the beliefs generated by inquiry are final once arrived at, 
in the sense that they have put doubt to rest, just as a judge’s opinion is 
final (for her) once her opinion is signed and her order entered.  But at the 
same time, the process of resolving doubt is tentative and experimental in 
spirit.  It claims only to have resolved the particular doubt (the case) that 
begat it, and in that way to have added to the resources available to us to 
resolve future doubts (to have become a part of the body of precedents).  
But the beliefs produced by inquiry recognize their own fallibility, 
because, as Peirce acknowledged, the most that inquiry can yield is a 
belief that “we shall think to be true.”113  We must acknowledge, insist 
even, that all of our beliefs are subject to revision upon further inquiry, by 
ourselves and by our community. 
Judicial opinions are necessarily fallible in this way.  They are, and 
can only be, the best product their authors can offer.  Because they are 
generated in a system of law that looks backwards, they do, just by virtue 
of their existence, become part of the body of law that binds their authors’ 
successors, but only part.  The proposition of law announced by any 
particular opinion may rightly be altered or reversed by a subsequent 
opinion that rests on a sounder understanding of the law as a whole. 
This fallibilistic understanding of adjudication emphatically does not 
embrace Posner’s skepticism about legal reasoning.  Fallibilism is anti-
skeptical, insisting that there are right answers to contested legal questions 
from the internal perspective of those who participate in the system of 
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adjudication, the judges themselves.114  But it also humbly acknowledges, 
as the pragmatist philosopher Hilary Putnam put it, “there are no 
metaphysical guarantees to be had that our most firmly held beliefs will 
never need revision.”115  For the fallibilist, the process of inquiry, re-
examination, and revision never ends.  Or, more teleologically, it ends 
only when it hits upon “the opinion which is fated to be agreed to by all 
who investigate.”116  That, as Peirce put it, is what we mean by the truth,117 
notwithstanding Richard Rorty's admonition that “there is no method of 
knowing when one has reached the truth or when one is closer to it than 
before.”118  In the meantime, life and inquiry (including by judges) go on, 
in search of that truth, unfazed by its elusiveness. 
VI. SOME PROMISING CONSEQUENCES OF FALLIBILISM 
What are the consequences for our question—how should judges 
decide cases—if a fallibilist understanding of truth is right, and especially 
if Dworkin’s account of judging is right, too?  First, the observations of 
the legal realists, the critical legal studies movement, and Judge Posner 
about how judges work no longer threaten the integrity of the rule of law.  
Of course, all judges bring extra-legal priors—the influences of 
upbringing, race, gender, sexual orientation, social class, religious 
background, personal values and worldview—to the task of deciding 
cases.  We all carry our priors to all of our tasks because as Hart reminded 
us, we are not gods, but only humans.119  In this respect, judges are no 
more hampered by their priors than historians, economists, philosophers,  
sociologists, or any other practitioners of inquiry into any aspect of the 
human situation. 
Priors are the inevitable conditions under which judges engage in the 
practice of legal interpretation.  To the extent their priors distort how 
judges carry out this practice, as they invariably do, their work product—
their opinions—is subject to evaluation, criticism, and, if the criticism is 
justified, eventual correction, so long as the practice itself has integrity.  
Dworkin’s signal contribution was to offer an account of legal 
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interpretation, which, if correct, provides that integrity.  If judicial 
opinions can be tested against the standard Dworkin proposes, to resolve 
each case in the way which best fits with the relevant law as seen through 
the lens of the political principles which best justify that law, we have 
done all we can to eliminate the distorting influence of judicial priors. 
The same is true of the indeterminacy critique of legal interpretation.  
Of course, the best reading of extant legal materials as applied to particular 
disputes is indeterminate, that is, contested, uncertain and often deeply 
controversial.  If legal disputes could be settled formulaically, by some 
agreed upon method or algorithm, we would have no need for judges, or 
even lawyers, at all.  We could similarly enter the relevant data (the facts) 
and agreed upon legal materials (the law) into a computer and wait a 
second or two for the software to spit out the result.  We need adjudication 
through legal interpretation because of the indeterminacy of legal 
argument.  Interpretation begins just where agreement ends, not vice-
versa.  The point of the interpretative inquiry is, as the pragmatists teach 
us, to allow the interpreter to move from uncertainty to her own belief.  
This belief, made concrete by the judge’s opinion and order, resolves the 
dispute.  But it is offered, as it must be, with awareness of its own 
fallibility, with knowledge that it may be “fated”120 to be overruled if later 
found to be inconsistent with a for that law sounder reading of the law 
taken as a whole.   
Second, if Dworkin’s account of legal interpretation is right, some 
fundamental political disagreements among judges are, unlike “priors,” 
internal to, rather than distortions of, legal interpretation.  Dworkin’s call 
for judges to move beyond a search for outcomes that cohere best with 
pre-existing law (important as that is) to those that also reflect the best 
political justification for that law, and indeed for our entire legal system, 
assures that controversy about political theory will and should play a 
major part in the adjudicative process.  If this call is justified, we should 
not be dismayed by the endemic ideological strife that has come to 
dominate discourse in and about the U.S. Supreme Court at least since the 
dawn of legal realism more than a century ago. 
Dworkin’s insistence on the centrality of political argument to legal 
interpretation is no doubt the most controversial part of his account of 
adjudication.  It grows out of the American legal system’s grounding in 
the United States Constitution, a document that is at once an enforceable 
legal text, an iteration of a republican theory of political governance, and 
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an aspiration to political and social justice (“We the people, in order to 
form a more perfect union”).121  Republican theory is, of course, complex 
and contested; complex in that it contains multiple elements (federalism, 
representative democracy, divided national power, individual rights, a 
second founding after the Civil War); and contested because we the people 
disagree about the primacy of these constituent elements when they are in 
tension and about the best understanding of each of them.  And it goes 
without saying that our disagreements about basic questions of justice are 
likely to be resolved only in the very, very long run, if ever.  It is thus both 
inevitable and quite proper that an American judge’s effort to understand 
the law which governs her resolution of the cases before her will be shaped 
by the political principles which she believes provide the best explanation 
and justification for the Constitution. 
To recognize that political disagreement is integral to legal 
interpretation has important implications for our process of confirming 
presidential nominations to the federal judiciary.  First, the Senate should 
work as hard to uncover and examine nominees’ basic political 
commitments as it does to evaluate their professional background, life 
experience, and general approach to the interpretive craft of judging.  This 
will not be easy.  Nominees, and the presidents who appoint them, will 
resist (as they do now) any exploration of their political ideas as irrelevant 
to the judicial role and, perhaps in the same breath, as intrusive into 
judicial independence.  And of course, requests that nominees declare how 
they might rule on hypothetical future cases would indeed compromise 
their overriding obligation to hear and evaluate the arguments presented 
in the real cases they will be asked to decide.  But nominees ought to be 
pressed on their present views on disputed issues of constitutional 
interpretation.  Among these might be the merit of originalism as a source 
of constitutional meaning, the importance of and limits on the role of 
precedent in constitutional adjudication, whether people have rights that 
are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution’s text, and whether the 
president’s exercise of Article II executive power is constrained by other 
constitutional limits.  These are just examples, almost random ones, from 
a potential list from which different questions will matter more or less to 
different senators. 
In a similar vein, senators should not shy away from asking nominees 
to provide their assessments of particular Supreme Court decisions, not 
just the results announced by these decisions, but the interpretive 
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approaches taken by the justices responsible for them.  Again, nominees 
can be expected to resist.  But senators may be capable of being 
unapologetically persistent.  If they are, and especially if they can also 
explain to the public why a nominee’s views of our constitutional history, 
and of the political ideas which underlie it, are essential components of 
her qualifications, it is possible that our present, desultory and largely 
pointless confirmation process will gradually improve. 
Senators should also be prepared to deny confirmation to a judicial 
nominee on explicitly political grounds.  Ideally, our presidents and 
senators, recognizing that disagreement about the political principles that 
best justify our law is a necessary part of legal interpretation, would seek 
a judiciary in which the distribution of political commitments roughly 
mirrors that of the country.  If that was the aim of our elected leaders, the 
political values of any given nominee should rarely be disqualifying, 
because her confirmation would not threaten the overall balance and 
diversity among judges on basic questions of political principle.  Sadly, 
our own political world is at some distance from this ideal, and has been 
for a long time.122  When presidents seek to dominate the judicial branch 
through relentless appointment of judges on the sole ground of shared 
ideological commitment, senators who do not share the president’s 
ideology are justified in resisting this domination by withholding 
confirmation, where they can, of the president’s nominees. 
The third consequence of Dworkin’s interpretive account of 
adjudication grows out of its call on judges to look exclusively backward 
for the sources of law that justify their resolution of cases.  When judges 
disagree, their dispute is about the meaning of these pre-existing sources 
and not about the resolution of the case that, according to their views as 
policy analysts, would yield the greatest benefit to society.  Even at 
Dworkin’s final interpretive stage, that of political justification, a judge’s 
commitment is to the principle or principles that best explain these pre-
existing sources.  Whatever the inevitable distorting effects of judicial 
priors, legal controversies are still actually about law, and the right 
answers to these controversies are those generated by the best 
interpretation of that law.  By what it includes—fidelity to the 
Constitution, statutes, and previous cases, and the principles which 
underlie them, and what it excludes—the judge’s personal background, 
identity, and policy preferences, Dworkin’s standard for evaluating 
judicial opinions satisfies the minimum criteria for adjudication under law 
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suggested at the beginning of this essay: the grounds for a judge’s decision 
(1) are not created by the judge herself and (2) provide a way to distinguish 
legal from non-legal reasons to support the decision.  A society where 
judges’ work is measured by its adherence to this standard is one that is 
governed by “laws and not men” [sic], one where the rule of law may 
accurately be said to prevail. 
Dworkin’s goal of restricting judges from policy-making by limiting 
their role to the interpretation of extant legal sources serves another basic, 
if obvious, value in a society, like our own, that is committed to 
democratic governance.  In a democracy, the people, or the people’s 
elected representatives, are the policymakers, constrained only by 
Constitutional limitations.  The primary vehicle for implementing the 
people’s policy choices is positive law, often in the form of statutes, 
sometimes by regulations promulgated under the authority of statutes, 
sometimes through executive orders.  Less often, but not infrequently, the 
people make policy directly, through initiative and referendum.  And, of 
course, it is “we the people,” who established the aspiration to a more 
perfect Union given legal effect by the United States Constitution.  When 
judges strive to provide the best interpretation of these sources of law, they 
honor democratic rule by implementing the policies established by the 
people.  If they instead view their power to decide cases under law as a 
warrant to impose their own policy views, they both diminish democracy 
and undermine their own legitimacy. 
A fourth and final point is suggested by the pragmatists’ admonition 
to all of us to acknowledge the fallibility of our beliefs, of even our most 
fundamental convictions.  As a judge proceeds from the position of doubt 
she must adopt at the beginning of a case through the process of 
adjudicating it, she should be mindful that her proposed resolution is based 
only on the “belief  [she] thinks shall be true.”123  That, of course, is all 
any belief or conclusion can ever be, and a judge cannot help but rely on 
it.  But even as she announces her belief, her rationale for her decision, 
she should acknowledge to herself that it may be wrong, that another 
interpretation, one she has rejected or perhaps didn’t even consider, may 
rightly come to supplant it. 
For a judge who follows Dworkin, this attitude of fallibility extends 
to her beliefs about how existing law best fits together and to the political 
principles which best explain and justify that law, and the legal system 
taken as a whole.  A judge can and must hold convictions, sometimes deep 
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ones, about all these matters.  But she must remain open to the possibility 
of revising, even rejecting, any or all of them, under the compulsion of a 
new and better argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Alexander Hamilton may have, to some extent, anticipated this 
pragmatic outlook in his defense of judicial review in Federalist 78.  
Famously, Hamilton argued for the authority of judges to have the final 
say on questions of law by pointing out that they can legitimately exercise 
“neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”124  The domain of force, 
under our Constitution, is that of the Executive Branch.125  The legitimate 
exercise of will is shared by the Executive and Congress, but not by 
judges.  Our problem—how judges should decide cases—centers on 
whether this division of power is possible.  Posner, the Legal Realists, and 
critical legal studies adherents argue, in effect, that it is not, that any effort 
to explain judgment as separate from an exercise of will must founder, 
taking the rule of law down with it. 
Hamilton obviously disagreed.  And though he did not provide a 
detailed explanation of how it differed from “will,” his choice of the 
phrase “merely judgment” is illuminating.  Each word deserves equal 
emphasis.  “Judgment” at the least refers at least to the non-mechanical, 
non-algorithmic character of adjudication.  Deciding cases requires 
judgment, not calculation.  It was the aim of both Dworkin and the 
pragmatists to show that its exercise is not an illusion.  But Hamilton’s 
choice of “merely” as a modifier is also intriguing.  Perhaps he meant it 
ironically, as a subtle acknowledgment of how much power the judicial 
branch might in fact come to wield, using only its single tool.  But if, on 
the other hand, he was guileless in characterizing the exercise of judgment 
as “mere,” he captured the essence of the pragmatic outlook.  A 
practitioner of mere judgment is always aware of her human limits.  
Because she knows her judgments are fallible, she will reach them only 
after carefully considering all arguments, and with deep respect for 
opposing perspectives.  She will strive to keep an open mind with respect 
to the questions she must decide.  Above all, she will proceed with an 
attitude of deep humility.  She “thinks her beliefs are true,” of course.  She 
has no choice.  But she knows that sooner or later, they might, for good 
reason, come to be displaced. 
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The exercise of “mere judgment,” in this sense, may capture the 
highest aspiration of the American tradition of judicial review.  There are 
good reasons to believe that those among us who are, or become judges 
are capable, in principle, of exercising it, or at least trying to.  If they can, 
our claim to be governed by the rule of law, may not be hollow.  At any 
rate, we ought to be very slow to give up on the aspiration. 
